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“To Serve Right and to Fight Wrong” 
Why Religion, Human Rights, and Human Dignity Need Each Other 
John Witte, Jr.1 
   
Abstract 
Pope Benedict XVI argued convincingly that Christianity and other religious 
communities not only laid the foundations for modern human rights, but remain 
essential allies in the struggle for human rights for all.  Theories of human dignity 
without religious mooring, claims of rights without reciprocal moral duties, and public 
deliberation without religious voices included are all impoverished, the Pope argued.  
Religion and human rights, in particular, need each other.  This Article offers an 
appreciative review of the Pope’s arguments and then offers further arguments about 
the necessary interaction of religion and human rights.  
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The Modern Context 
"A sense of the dignity of the human person has been impressing itself more and 
more deeply on the consciousness of contemporary man," Pope Paul VI declared in his 
preface to Dignitatis Humanae (1965). "And the demand is increasingly made that men 
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should act on their own judgment, enjoying and making use of a responsible freedom, 
not driven by coercion but motivated by a sense of duty."2 
This was an historic statement about human dignity, signaling a momentous 
swing in the pendulum of world opinion.  Only two decades before, the world had stared 
in horror into Hitler's death camps and Stalin's gulags where all sense of humanity and 
dignity had been brutally sacrificed.  In response, the world had seized anew on the 
ancient concept of human dignity, claiming this as the "ur-principle"3 of a new world 
order.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 opened its preamble with 
classic words: "recognition in the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights 
of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in 
the world."4   
By the mid-1960s, church and state alike had translated this general principle of 
human dignity into specific human rights precepts.  In Dignitatis Humanae and several 
other documents produced during and after the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), 
the Roman Catholic Church took some of the first decisive steps.  Every person, the 
Church now taught, is created by God with "dignity, intelligence and free will ... and has 
rights flowing directly and simultaneously from his very nature."5  Such rights include the 
right to life and adequate standards of living, to moral and cultural values, to religious 
activities, to assembly and association, to marriage and family life, and to various social, 
political, and economic benefits and opportunities.  The Church emphasized the 
religious rights of conscience, worship, assembly, and education, calling them the "first 
rights" of any civic order.  The Church also stressed the need to balance individual and 
associational rights, particularly those involving the church, family, and school.  It urged 
the abolition of discrimination on grounds of sex, race, color, social distinction, 
language, or religion.6  Within a decade, various Ecumenical groups, some Protestants, 
and a few Orthodox Christian groups crafted comparable comprehensive declarations 
on human rights and human dignity.7   
Not only the world's churches, but also the United Nations and several nation-
states issued a number of landmark documents on human dignity and human rights in 
the 1960s.  Foremost among these were the two international covenants promulgated 
by the United Nations in 1966, each of which confirmed the belief in the "inherent 
dignity" and "the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family," and 
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the belief that all such "rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person."8 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966) posed as 
essential to human dignity the rights to self-determination, subsistence, work, welfare, 
security, education, and cultural participation.  The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (1966) set out a long catalogue of rights: to life and to security of person 
and property, freedom from slavery and cruelty, basic civil and criminal procedural 
protections, rights to travel and pilgrimage, freedoms of religion, expression, and 
assembly, rights to marriage and family life, and freedom from discrimination on 
grounds of race, color, sex, language, and national origin.  Other international and 
domestic instruments issued in the later 1960s took close aim at racial, religious, and 
gender discrimination in education, employment, social welfare programs, and other 
forms and forums of public life -- viewing such discrimination as a fundamental betrayal 
of the "dignity and equality inherent in all human beings."9   
So matters stood a half century ago.  Today, the concept of human dignity has 
become ubiquitous to the point of cliché -- a moral trump frayed by overuse, a general 
principle twisted by repeated manipulation.  We now read regularly of the dignity of  
luxury, pleasure, and leisure; the dignity of identity, belonging, and difference; the 
dignity of ethnic, cultural, and linguistic purity; the dignity of sex, gender, and sexual 
preference; the dignity of aging, dying, and death.  At the same time, the corpus of 
human rights has become swollen to the point of eruption -- with many recent rights 
claims no longer anchored in universal norms of human dignity, natural justice, or the 
common good, but aired as special aspirations of an individual or a group.   
Even more worrisome is that the place of religion in human rights, and the 
protection of religious freedom as an essential first principle of any just legal order is 
become increasingly contested today.  Religion, many critics now argue, is too 
expansionistic and monopolistic, too patriarchal and hierarchical, too antithetical to the 
very ideals of pluralism, toleration, and equality to be useful for a modern human rights 
regime.  Religion should be treated as just another category of private liberty, 
expression, and association and given no more preference than its secular 
counterparts. Indeed, to accord religion special human rights treatment is to 
discriminate against non-religious claimants in the same position.  Purge religious 
freedom entirely, this argument concludes, and the human rights paradigm will thrive 
better.10 
Pope Benedict’s Challenge 
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Pope Benedict XVI challenged this alarming new trend and called church, state, 
and the world back to the founding human rights principles of the mid-twentieth century.  
Standing in Westminster Hall in 2010 – on the very spot where Thomas More had stood 
a half millennium before in sacrificial defense of freedom -- the Pope praised the British 
common law tradition of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, with its 
guarantees of liberty, equality, and due process of law.  But he then warned Parliament 
that religion “is not a problem for legislators to solve, but a vital contributor” to the 
cultivation of a “better understanding” and more “effective implementation” of a just legal 
and political system. The Pope challenged “the increasing marginalization of religion, 
particularly of Christianity” in England and the West more generally.  He challenged 
“those who advocate that the voice of religion be silenced” or privatized.  He challenged 
the growing campaign to rid the public square of its religious symbols, ceremonies, and 
speech.  All this deprecation of religion, the Pope declared, comes from a massive 
“failure to appreciate not only the rights of believers to freedom of conscience and 
freedom of religion, but also the legitimate role of religion” in public life and public law.11  
This new deprecation of religion also fails to appreciate the essential role of 
religion in building and maintaining the modern legal regime of human rights, the Pope 
continued in his address to the Parliament of Germany in 2011. “In history, systems of 
law have almost always been based on religion.”  And in the West, this has been 
especially true in the development of the law of human rights.  Already early Church 
Fathers like Origen claimed the freedom of association, speech, and conscience. Later 
Fathers like Ambrose and Augustine claimed the freedom of the clergy and laity alike “to 
serve right and to fight against wrong,” whether perpetrated by a tyrannical monarch or 
a tyrannical majority.  Medieval and early modern writers like Thomas Aquinas and 
Francisco de Vitoria combined reason and nature, Greek philosophy and Roman law to 
build much of the basic architecture of public, private, penal, and procedural laws and 
rights. These early intellectual achievements, the Pope declared, opened up “the path 
that led via the Christian Middle Ages and the juridical developments of the Age of 
Enlightenment all the way to the [Universal] Declaration of Human Rights [of 1948] and 
to our German Basic Law of 1949, with which our nation committed itself to ‘inviolable 
and inalienable human rights as the foundation of every human community, and of 
peace and justice in the world’.”12 (This Protestant historian must add that early modern 
Lutherans, Calvinists, Anglicans, and Anabaptists played vital roles in this development 
of human rights and rule of law as well.13) 
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But Christianity and other religious traditions are not just an historical source of 
our modern norms of human rights, the Pope argued in 2008 address to the United 
Nations General Assembly. Religion was not just the scaffolding that was used to build 
the edifice of human rights edifice, and should now be taken down lest the full view of 
this new legal structure be obstructed.  To the contrary, the Pope argued, religion 
remains an essential part of the foundation and infrastructure of the modern human 
rights regime.  For religious communities teach and insist on the most fundamental 
“idea of the person as image of the Creator” which is “the absolute and the essence of 
freedom.” It on the foundation of the inherent dignity of “the human creature” that the 
world could agree to issue the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 despite 
the vast differences among modern cultures and faiths. “The rights recognized and 
expounded in the Declaration apply to everyone by virtue of the common origin of the 
person, who remains the high-point of God’s creative design for the world and for 
history.”14   
To ignore that essential foundation of human dignity – and the religious 
communities that uniquely support this anthropology -- is to destroy its “inner unity” of 
the Universal Declaration and to move human rights inevitably “towards the satisfaction 
of simple interests, often particular interests.”  It is to destroy the “commonly held sense 
of justice built primarily upon solidarity among the members of society” and to replace it 
with a “narrowly utilitarian” concern for private happiness and the attainment of personal 
desire. It is to destroy its common commitment to the Golden Rule -- “Do unto others as 
you would have done unto you” – to a narrowly legalistic notion of “applying correct 
procedures.”  And it is to separate the essential connection between human rights and 
human responsibilities.15 
Human rights are ultimately too important and intricate a gift of God to humanity 
to be left to only for individuals to pursue or for individual states to protect, even with the 
backing of the United Nations.  Human rights also require the continued nurture and 
challenge of the world’s faith communities. The Pope put it thus to the UN General 
Assembly: 
[A] vision of life anchored in the religious dimension can help 
to achieve this, since recognition of the transcendent value 
of every man and woman favours conversion of heart, which 
then leads to a commitment to resist violence, terrorism and 
war, and to promote justice and peace.  This also provides 
the proper context for the inter-religious dialogue that the 
United Nations is called to support…. It pertains to the 
nature of religions, freely practiced that they can 
autonomously conduct a dialogue of thought and life…. Their 
 
 
14 Address of His Holiness, United Nations General Assembly, New York (18 April 2008), ¶5-6. 
15 Ibid., ¶¶6-8. 
6 
task is to propose a vision of faith not in terms of intolerance, 
discrimination, and conflict, but in terms of complete respect 
for truth, coexistence, rights, and reconciliation.16 
It is for this reason, among others, that religious freedom is so vital to the entire 
apparatus of human rights today, the Pope concluded.  Not only is religious freedom the 
bedrock of other rights, but the free exercise of religion is essential for the maintenance 
of other rights.  “It is inconceivable that believers should have to suppress a part of 
themselves – their faith – in order to be active citizens.  It should never be necessary to 
deny God in order to enjoy one’s rights. The rights associated with religion are all the 
more in need of protection if they are considered to clash with a prevailing secular 
ideology or with majority religious positions of an exclusive nature.”17   
As a Protestant, interested in the religious foundations and dimensions of human 
rights and the robust protection of religious freedom, I agree wholeheartedly with the 
Holy Father that religion and human rights need each other.  On the one hand, human 
rights norms need religion. There is, of course, some value in simply declaring human 
rights norms of “liberty, equality, and fraternity” or “life, liberty, and property”—if for no 
other reason than to pose an ideal against which a person or community might measure 
itself, to preserve a normative totem for later generations to make real. But, ultimately, 
these abstract human rights ideals of the good life and the good society depend on the 
visions and values of human communities and institutions to give them content and 
coherence—to provide what Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain once called “the 
scale of values governing [their] exercise and concrete manifestation.”18  It is here that 
religion must play a vital role. Religion is an ineradicable condition of human lives and 
human communities. Religions invariably provide many of the sources and “scales of 
values” by which many persons and communities govern themselves. Religions 
inevitably help to define the meanings and measures of shame and regret, restraint and 
respect, responsibility and restitution that a human rights regime presupposes. 
Religions must thus be seen as indispensable allies in the modern struggle for human 
rights. To exclude them from the struggle is impossible, indeed catastrophic. To include 
them, by enlisting their unique resources and protecting their unique rights, is vital to 
enhancing the regime of human rights and to easing some of the worst paradoxes that 
currently exist. 
Conversely, religion needs human rights norms both to protect them and to 
challenge them. There is, of course, some merit in religious believers and groups quietly 
accepting the current protections of a modern human rights regime—the guarantees of 
liberty of conscience, freedom of exercise, rights to religious self-determination, and the 
 
 
16 Ibid., ¶10. 
17 Ibid., ¶11. 
18  Jacques Maritain, “Introduction,” in UNESCO, Human Rights: Comments and Interpretations (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1949). 
7 
like.  But passive acquiescence in a secular scheme of human rights ultimately will not 
prove effective.  And failure to press the unique rights claims of religious believers and 
communities will eventually leave many religious beliefs, practices, and communities too 
vulnerable.  Religious communities must reclaim their own voices within the secular 
human rights dialogue, and reclaim the human rights voices within their own internal 
religious dialogues. Religious communities must be open to a new human rights 
hermeneutic--fresh methods of interpreting their sacred texts and traditions that will 
allow them to reclaim their essential roots and roles in the cultivation of human rights.  
Religious traditions cannot allow secular human rights norms to be imposed on them 
from without; they must (re)discover them from within.   
Both theses – that human rights need religion, and that religion need human 
rights – are controversial.  The next two sections seek to defend both theses.  
Religion in Human Rights   
A number of distinguished commentators have argued that religion should have 
no place in a modern regime of human rights.  Religious ideas may well have been the 
sources of human rights in earlier eras, they allow.  Some religious groups might even 
have helped to inspire the modern human rights revolution that began with the 
promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).  But religion, these 
religious skeptics argue, has now outlived its utility.  Even Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam do not speak unequivocally about human rights, and none has amassed an 
exemplary human rights record over the centuries.  Their sacred texts and canons say 
much more about commandments and obligations than about liberties and rights.  Their 
theologians and jurists have resisted the importation of human rights as much as they 
have helped in their cultivation.  Their internal policies and external advocacy have 
helped to perpetuate bigotry, chauvinism, and violence as much as they have served to 
propagate equality, liberty, and fraternity.  The blood of thousands is at the doors of our 
churches, temples, and mosques.  The bludgeons of pogroms, crusades, jihads, 
inquisitions, and ostracisms have been used to devastating effect within and among 
these faiths.  They must now move aside.  
This argument proves too much to be practicable. In the course of the twentieth 
century, religion defied the wistful assumptions of the Western academy that the spread 
of Enlightenment reason and science would slowly eclipse the sense of the sacred and 
the sensibility of the superstitious.  Religion also defied the evil assumptions of Nazis, 
Fascists, and Communists alike that gulags and death camps, iconoclasm and book 
burnings, propaganda and mind controls would inevitably drive religion into extinction.  
Yet another great awakening of religion is upon us—now global in its sweep and 
frightening in its power.  
It is undeniable that religion has been, and still is, a formidable force for both 
political good and political evil, that it has fostered both benevolence and belligerence, 
peace and pathos of untold dimensions.  But the proper response to religious 
belligerence and pathos cannot be to deny that religion exists or to dismiss it to the 
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private sphere and sanctuary.  The proper response is to castigate the vices and to 
cultivate the virtues of religion, to confirm those religious teachings and practices that 
are most conducive to human rights, democracy, and rule of law. 
Human rights norms ultimately need religious ideas, institutions, and rights 
claims to survive and thrive.  First, without religion, many rights are cut from their roots. 
The right to religion, Georg Jellinek once wrote, is “the mother of many other rights.”19  
For the religious individual, the right to believe leads ineluctably to the rights to 
assemble, speak, worship, proselytize, educate, parent, travel, or to abstain from the 
same on the basis of one’s beliefs. For the religious association, the right to exist 
invariably involves rights to corporate property, collective worship, organized charity, 
parochial education, freedom of press, and autonomy of governance. To ignore 
religious rights is to overlook the conceptual, and often the historical, source of many 
other individual and associational rights. 
Second, without religion, the regime of human rights becomes infinitely 
expandable.  Many religious communities adopt and advocate human rights in order to 
protect religious duties.  A religious individual or association has rights to exist and act 
not in the abstract but in order to discharge discrete religious duties.  For many 
religions, freedoms and commandments, rights and duties belong together.  To speak of 
one without the other is ultimately destructive.  Rights without duties to guide them 
quickly become claims of self-indulgence.  Duties without rights to exercise them quickly 
become sources of deep guilt.  
Third, without religion, human rights become too captive to Western libertarian 
ideals.  Many religious traditions cannot conceive of, nor accept, a system of rights that 
excludes, deprecates, or privatizes religion.  Religion is for these traditions inextricably 
integrated into every facet of life.  The rights of religion are, for them, an inherent part of 
rights of speech, press, assembly, and other individual rights as well as ethnic, cultural, 
linguistic, and similar associational rights.  No system of rights that ignores or 
deprecates this cardinal place of religion can be respected or adopted. 
Fourth, without religion, the state is often given an exaggerated role to play as 
the guarantor of human rights.  The simple state-versus-individual dialectic of many 
modern human rights theories leaves it to the state to protect and provide rights of all 
sorts.  In reality, the state is not, and cannot be, so omnicompetent, as the fantastic 
failures of the twentieth-century Communist states made all too clear.  Numerous 
"mediating structures" stand between the state and the individual, religious institutions 
prominently among them.  Religious institutions, among others, play a vital role in the 
cultivation and realization of rights.  They can create the conditions (sometimes the 
prototypes) for the realization of first generation civil and political rights.  They can 
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provide a critical (sometimes the principal) means to meet second generation rights of 
education, health care, child care, labor organizations, employment, artistic 
opportunities, among others. They can offer some of the deepest insights into norms of 
creation, stewardship, and servanthood that lie at the heart of third generation rights. 
Human Rights in Religion   
My converse thesis is that human rights must have a more prominent place in the 
theological discourse and institutional practice of modern religions.  Many would 
consider this second thesis to be as misguided as the first.  It is one thing, such human 
rights skeptics argue, for religious believers and bodies to accept the freedom and 
autonomy that a human rights regime allows.  This at least gives them unencumbered 
space to pursue their divine callings.  It is quite another thing for religious communities 
to import human rights within their own polities and theologies.  This exposes them to all 
manner of unseemly challenges.  
Human rights norms, these skeptics argue, challenge the structure of religious 
bodies.  While human rights norms teach liberty and equality, most religious bodies 
teach authority and hierarchy.  While human rights norms encourage pluralism and 
diversity, many religious bodies require orthodoxy and uniformity.  While human rights 
norms teach freedoms of speech and petition, several religions teach duties of silence 
and submission.  To draw human rights norms into the structures of religion would only 
seem to embolden members to demand greater access to religious governance, greater 
freedom from religious discipline, greater latitude in the definition of religious doctrine 
and liturgy.  So why import them? 
Moreover, human rights norms challenge the spirit of religious bodies.  Human 
rights norms, these skeptics argue, are the creed of a secular faith born of 
Enlightenment liberalism, humanism, and rationalism.  Human rights advocates 
regularly describe these norms as our new "civic faith," "our new world religion," "our 
new global moral language."  The influential French jurist Karel Vasak pressed these 
sentiments into a full confession of the secular spirit of the modern human rights 
movement:  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights [of 1948], like 
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen in 
1789, has had an immense impact throughout the world.  It 
has been called a modern edition of the New Testament, 
and the Magna Carta of humanity, and has become a 
constant source of inspiration for governments, for judges, 
and for national and international legislators.... [B]y 
recognizing the Universal Declaration as a living document 
10 
... one can proclaim one’s faith in the future of mankind.20 
In demonstration of this new faith, Vasak converted the “old trinity” of “liberté, 
equalité, et fraternité” taught by the French Revolution into a “new trinity” of “three 
generations of rights” for all humanity. The first generation of civil and political rights 
elaborates the meaning of liberty. The second generation of social, cultural, and 
economic rights elaborates the meaning of equality. The third generation of solidarity 
rights to peace, orderly development, and environmental protection elaborates the 
meaning of fraternity. Such language has become not only the lingua franca but also 
something of the lingua sacra of the modern human rights movement.  In the face of 
such an overt confession of secular liberalism, religious skeptics conclude, a religious 
body would do well to resist the ideas and institutions of human rights. 
Both these skeptical arguments, however, presuppose that human rights norms 
constitute a static belief system born of Enlightenment liberalism. But the human rights 
regime is not static. It is fluid, elastic, and open to challenge and change.  The human 
rights regime is not a fundamental belief system. It is a relative system of ideas and 
ideals that presupposes the existence of fundamental beliefs and values that will 
constantly shape and reshape it.  The human rights regime is not the child of 
Enlightenment liberalism, nor a ward under its exclusive guardianship.  It is the ius 
gentium of our times, the common law of nations, which a variety of Hebrew, Greek, 
Roman, Christian, and Enlightenment movements have historically nurtured in the West 
and which today needs the constant nurture of multiple communities around the world.  
It is beyond doubt that many current formulations of human rights are suffused with 
fundamental libertarian beliefs and values, some of which run counter to the cardinal 
beliefs of various religious traditions.  But liberalism does not and should not have a 
monopoly on the nurture of human rights; indeed, a human rights regime cannot long 
survive under its exclusive patronage. 
I use the antique term ius gentium advisedly -- to signal the place of human rights 
as "middle axioms" in our moral and political discourse.  Historically, Western writers 
spoke of a hierarchy of laws -- from natural law (ius naturale), to common law (ius 
gentium), to civil law (ius civile).  The natural law was the set of immutable principles of 
reason and conscience, which are supreme in authority and divinity and must always 
prevail in instances of dispute.  The civil law was the set of enacted laws and 
procedures of local political communities, reflecting their immediate policies and 
procedures.  Between these two sets of norms was the ius gentium, the set of principles 
and customs common to several communities and often the basis for treaties and other 
diplomatic conventions.  The contents of the ius gentium did gradually change over time 
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and across cultures as new interpretations of the natural law were offered, and as new 
formulations of the positive law became increasingly conventional.  But the ius gentium 
was a relatively consistent body of principles by which a person and a people could 
govern themselves.  
This antique typology helps us to understand the intermediate place of human 
rights in our hierarchy of legal and cultural norms today.  Human rights are the ius 
gentium of our time, the middle axioms of our discourse. They are derived from and 
dependent upon the transcendent principles that religious traditions (more than any 
other group) continue to cultivate. They also inform, and are informed by, shifts in the 
customs and conventions of sundry state law systems. These human rights norms do 
gradually change over time: just compare the international human rights instruments of 
1948 with those of today. But human rights norms are a relatively stable set of ideals by 
which a person and community might be guided and judged. 
This antique typology also helps us to understand the place of human rights 
within religion.  My argument that human rights must have a more prominent place 
within religions today is not an attempt to import libertarian ideals into their theologies 
and polities. It is not an attempt to herd Trojan horses into churches, synagogues, 
mosques, and temples to assail secretly their spirit and structure.  My argument is, 
rather, that religious bodies must again assume their traditional patronage and 
protection of human rights, bringing to this regime their full doctrinal vigor, liturgical 
healing, and moral suasion. Using our antique typology, religious bodies must again 
nurture and challenge the middle axioms of the ius gentium using the transcendent 
principles of the ius naturale. This must not be an effort to monopolize the discourse, 
nor to establish by positive law a particular religious construction of human rights.  Such 
an effort must be part of a collective discourse of competing understandings of the ius 
naturale—of competing theological views of the divine and the human, of good and evil, 
of individuality and community—that will serve constantly to inform and reform, to 
develop and deepen, the human rights ideals now in place. 
A number of religious traditions of late have begun the process of reengaging the 
regime of human rights, of returning to their traditional roots and routes of nurturing and 
challenging the human rights regime. This process has been incremental, clumsy, 
controversial, and at times even fatal for its proponents. But the process of religious 
engagement of human rights is now under way in Christian, Islamic, Judaic, Buddhist, 
Confucian, Hindu, and Indigenous communities alike. Something of a new “human 
rights hermeneutic” is slowly beginning to emerge among modern religions.21  
This is, in part, a “hermeneutic of confession.” Given their checkered human 
rights records over the centuries, religious bodies have begun to acknowledge their 
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departures from the cardinal teachings of peace and love that are the heart of their 
sacred texts and traditions.  Christian churches have taken the lead in this process—
from the Second Vatican Council’s confession of prior complicity in authoritarianism, to 
the contemporary church’s repeated confessions of prior support for apartheid, 
communism, racism, sexism, fascism, and anti-Semitism. 
This is, in part, a “hermeneutic of suspicion,” in Paul Ricoeur’s famous phrase. 
Given the pronounced libertarian tone of many recent human rights formulations, it is 
imperative that we not idolize or idealize these formulations. We need not be bound by 
current taxonomies of “three generations of rights” rooted in liberty, equality, and 
fraternity.   Nor do we need to accept the seemingly infinite expansion of human rights 
discourse and demands. Rights bound by moral duties, by natural capacities, or by 
covenantal relationships might well provide better boundaries to the legitimate 
expression and extension of rights.  
This is, in part, a “hermeneutic of history.” While acknowledging the fundamental 
contributions of Enlightenment liberalism to the modern rights regime, we must also see 
the deeper genesis and genius of many modern rights norms in religious texts and 
traditions that antedate the Enlightenment by centuries, even by millennia. We must 
return to our religious sources.  In part, this is a return to ancient sacred texts freed from 
the casuistic accretions of generations of jurists and freed from the cultural trappings of 
the communities in which these traditions were born. In part, this is a return to slender 
streams of theological jurisprudence that have not been part of the mainstream of the 
religious traditions, or have become diluted by too great a commingling with it. In part, 
this is a return to prophetic voices of dissent, long purged from traditional religious 
canons, but, in retrospect, prescient of some of the rights roles that the tradition might 
play today.   
And this is, in part, a “hermeneutic of law and religion.”  A century of legal 
positivism in the Western academy has trained us to think that law is an autonomous 
discipline, free from the influence of religion and belief.  A century of firm laicization and 
strict separation of church and state has accustomed us to think that our law and politics 
must be hermetically and hermeneutically sealed from the corrosive influences of 
religious believers and bodies.  The reality is that law and religion need each other, 
especially in the vital regime of human rights.   
All four of these hermeneutics are brilliantly exemplified in Pope Benedict XVI’s 
five lectures analyzed in this volume.  One can find comparable such statements from 
Chief Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks and His Holiness the XIVth Dalai Lama, among 
others.22  If other religious leaders around the world would also take seriously the 
challenge of religion and human rights, the world might slowly develop a new 
 
 
22 See their articles in the symposium issue, “The Pursuit of Happiness in Interreligious Perspective,” 
Journal of Law and Religion 29 (2014): 5-123. 
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“concordance of discordant canons” and actions about the most fundamental value of 
human persons and peoples – their inherent and inviolable human dignity. 
